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Theories of the Trust and What They Might 
Mean for Beneficiary Rights to Information
JESSICA PALMER*
The trust is a mental contstruct used to explain a type of guardian-
ship of property. There are traditionally two ways to understand the 
trust — one sees the trust as creating proprietary rights and duties; 
the other as establishing personal rights and duties as between the 
trustee and beneficiary. This articles considers the evidence for both 
and argues that it is important to clarify the conceptual basis of the 
trust because it can affect the substance of trusts law. This point 
is illustrated by the various answers that have been given to the 
particular question of whether beneficiaries have a right to access 
trust information.
I  Introduction
The express trust is a complex and abstract creature. It often proves very 
difficult to conceptualise, with exceptions and inconsistencies plaguing 
the brave soul attempting to understand it. Yet, notwithstanding this (even 
perhaps because of this), it has almost unparalleled popularity in our society 
as a legal device used across a range of familial and commercial contexts. 
This requires that some effort be made to explain it and to highlight its 
strengths and identify any current weaknesses in order to assess whether 
any reform is desirable.
This article explains two common and distinct theories of the nature of 
the express trust, proprietary and obligations-based, and each is evaluated 
in the light of some well-accepted rules and doctrines of trusts law. Having 
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shown that both find support from the various rules relating to express trusts, 
the content of trustees’ duties in particular brings into focus the differences 
between the two conceptions and presents a good reason for having to 
refine further how the trust is most accurately conceptualised. All of this is 
not merely academic because it can, and ought to, affect what the various 
rules and doctrines of trust law should require. The final section of this 
article seeks to illustrate this point in the context of beneficiary rights, more 
particularly whether beneficiaries do, and should have, a right to access trust 
documents. It is suggested here that beneficiaries’ rights ought to correspond 
with trustees’ duties. Rights are the necessary correlative of duties. Without 
rights, duties have no purpose; without duties, rights are unenforceable. As 
Millet LJ stated in Armitage v Nurse [Armitage],1 “there is an irreducible 
core of obligations owed by the trustees to the beneficiaries and enforceable 
by them which is fundamental to the concept of a trust. If the beneficiaries 
have no rights enforceable against the trustee there are no trusts.”2 Thus, 
defining the scope and content of the trustee’s duties is extremely important 
and, it will be seen, is affected by the two conceptions of the trust.
II  Alternative Views of the Nature of the Trust
It is possible to conceive of a trust in at least two paradigms. First, the trust 
can be conceived of as a mechanism of property. This view entails that 
fundamental to a trust is that a trustee holds property belonging beneficially 
to another. The express trust is a structured transfer of property from the 
settlor to the beneficiaries, achieved by means that are unavailable at law.3 
It is akin to a donation of property and, as such, the terms of the trust are 
not a matter of agreement between the donor (the settlor) and donee (the 
trustee),4 but rather are terms that run with the property binding successors 
in title. It has been suggested that the property conception requires that 
there must be trust property and that there must be a separation between the 
legal and equitable ownership of that trust property.5 The focus of the trust 
is the property with which it is concerned and the split ownership of it, and 
 1 !"#$%&'()*)+,"-()!"##$%&'(&)*"&+',-&!!"#$%&'(%.&
 2 Ibid, at 253.
 3 James Penner “Exemptions” in Peter Birks and Arianna Pretto (eds) Breach of Trust 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) 241 at 261.
 4 The intended trustee may, of course, refuse the trusteeship, but this is not fatal to the 
existence of the trust; see cases referred to below Part IIIA.
 5 DWM Waters “The Nature of the Trust Beneficiary’s Interest” (1967) 45 Can BR 219; 
Patrick Parkinson “Reconceptualising the Express Trust” (2002) 61 CLJ 657 at 658.
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the (mainly proprietary) obligations that consequentially arise to effect that 
split ownership.
The second popular paradigm of the trust is that it is primarily concerned 
with personal obligations that happen to be mediated through property. The 
trust property is the trustee’s own, but is subject to special obligations on the 
trustee that by their very nature will have effects on his rights to the property. 
As stated by Parkinson, a proponent of the obligation-based view:6
[I]t is incorrect to think of trusts always in terms of legal and equitable 
ownership. Rather, the core idea of the private express trust lies in the notion 
of equitable obligations in relation to property, which in most cases will also 
give to beneficiaries commensurate property rights in equity.
Under this model, the concern is with the obligations with which the trustee 
must comply and, because these obligations are generally considered to be 
voluntarily undertaken,7 the trust is more appropriately seen as a consensual 
arrangement, akin perhaps to a contract. Hence, the trust is considered to be a 
negotiated relationship, or a deal, between the settlor and trustee that affects 
the trustee’s relationships with a third party, the beneficiary.8
The implications of these two differing paradigms may at times be a dis-
agreement over the requirements of particular doctrines and rules of trusts 
law. For example, to use a recent controversy, what is necessary to amount to 
a sham trust may differ under these two approaches. It may be thought that 
the creation of a sham trust is to be determined by analogy with the creation 
of a legitimate express trust. If so, then under the traditional proprietary 
view that a trust is akin to a donation of property to beneficiaries mediated 
by trustees, it is the intention of the settlor/donor alone that is relevant to 
determining whether the transaction was a true trust or a mere façade.9 
However, if the trust is considered a creature of obligations, and those 
obligations are considered to be assumed by (rather than imposed upon) 
the trustee, then as much as the trustee’s intention or consent is relevant to 
 6 Parkinson, above n 5, at 663. See also L Smith “Trust and Patrimony” (2009) 28 ETPJ 
332.
 7 See, for example, Chirnside v Fay [2006] NZSC 68, [2007] 1 NZLR 433 at [87] per 
Tipping J.
 8 John H Langbein “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts” (1996) 105 Yale LJ 
625.
 9 This was part of the basis for my argument that sham trusts do not require a common 
intention; see Jessica Palmer “Dealing with the Emerging Popularity of Sham Trusts” 
[2007] NZ L Rev 81.
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establishing a legitimate trust, it must likewise be relevant to establishing a 
sham trust.10
It is important to note, of course, that not all will necessarily consider 
the underlying conceptualisation of the trust as being either proprietary 
or obligational as itself determinative of such issues. For example, again 
in relation to sham trusts, some have argued that the concept of sham is a 
doctrine in its own right that is applicable across different contexts of private 
transactions, such as contracts, companies and trusts. In accordance with this 
view, determining whether a sham has arisen does not require consideration 
of, or consistency with, how the underlying transaction would be created 
were it to be valid. For example, establishing that a trust is a sham does not 
turn on whether the three certainties necessary for the creation of a true 
trust are present, as is likely required under the property paradigm. Sham 
applies, it is arguable, as a separate doctrine across all transactional forms, 
with its own independent doctrinal features, and is accordingly distinct from 
the particular requirements of individual transaction types.11 Thus, it could 
be possible to view the trust as created not by agreement, but solely by the 
settlor’s intention (the property conception), and yet deem it appropriate to 
require a common intention between settlor and trustee when establishing 
whether the transaction in question amounts to a sham trust.
Nevertheless, the purpose of this reference to sham trusts is not to per-
suade the reader of the better view on the intention requirement of sham 
trusts, but rather to point out that much of one’s views on particular issues 
within trust law may be guided, for better or worse, by their conception of 
the basis of the express trust as being either predominantly proprietary or 
predominantly obligation-based. Thus, an awareness of these two influential 
conceptions is certainly most helpful and, I would argue, necessary to 
ensure that the more particular principles of trust law are, as far as possible, 
conceptually coherent.
Of course, arguments about specific trust issues, such as the relevant 
intention requirement of sham trusts, could be more easily resolved if one 
of the two conceptions of the trust could be convincingly, and perhaps 
authoritatively, rejected leaving the surviving one to provide the solution to 
whatever particular problem is at hand. Thus, one must ask whether there 
is any support for either of the proprietary or obligational paradigms of the 
trust in the law of trusts as it is generally understood today.
 10 W Patterson “When is a trust a trust?” (paper delivered at the Legal Research Foundation 
Conference, A Modern Law of Trusts, Auckland, 28 August 2009).
 11 See, for example, Matthew Conaglen “Sham Trusts” (2008) 67 CLJ 176; Matthew 
Conaglen “Shams, trusts and mutual intention” [2008] NZLJ 227.
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III  Assessing the Alternative Views in the Light of Accepted Trusts 
Law
There are various rules and doctrines within trust law that suggest that the 
fundamental concern of the trust is with the vesting of legal title to property 
in A where the real or beneficial ownership of that property in fact lies with 
B. Any obligations that are associated with the trust exist merely to give 
meaning to that underlying proprietary transaction. Ultimately, the trust must 
give effect to the beneficial interest of the beneficiary.
However, as with the proprietary model, there are also various rules 
and doctrines that suggest the trust is instead essentially concerned with 
obligations, predominantly personal obligations, and not with title. Rather 
than present the case for each approach in turn, this section of the article 
will highlight different aspects of the law of trusts and identify which, if 
either, conception of the trust they support. This is by no means a conclusive 
exercise, but it nevertheless gives substance to the debate outlined above.12
A Creating and terminating an express trust
In relation to creating a trust, the obligational model of the trust would 
seem to rely on an agreement of sorts between the settlor and trustee in 
order for a trust to arise and the trustee to be bound to his trust obligations. 
Yet, the doctrine established by those cases that hold that the trustee has 
the ability to disclaim a trust suggests that the trustee’s acceptance is not 
essential to a trust. Although no one can be compelled to act as trustee, it 
is a basic equitable principle that a trust will not be allowed to fail for want 
of a trustee.13 Where a trustee disclaims his appointment, the trust property 
revests in the settlor, but she holds it upon the trust of the initial settlement 
because the provisional vesting in the trustee until disclaimer is sufficient to 
constitute the trust.14 Further, where there is no trustee, the court will almost 
always appoint one, except where the appointment of a particular person 
as trustee is crucial to the intended purpose of the trust.15 These rules may 
suggest that a trust is created by the transfer of property to one party to be 
used for the benefit of another and that it does not depend on any assent to 
 12 Beneficiaries’ rights, as an aspect of the law of trusts, will not be considered in this 
section, but will be the subject of more detailed analysis later in this article.
 13 Re Lysaght [1966] Ch 191 (Ch) [Lysaght].
 14 Mallott v Wilson [1903] 2 Ch 494 (Ch). See also Mowbray et al, Lewin on Trusts (17th 
ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2000) at [12-19].
 15 Lysaght, above n 13; but, in such a case, the property will revert to the settlor on a 
resulting trust.
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the arrangement by the would-be trustee.16 It is important to appreciate that 
giving a person the liberty to disclaim a trust does not indicate anything 
about the nature of the trust as an agreement. It merely reflects the notion 
that equity — which as a jurisdiction is often said to be based upon notions 
of conscience — would itself be acting unconscionably if it were to require 
people, who did not affirm a willingness to take on the heavy obligations of 
trusteeship, nonetheless to take them on. The heavy obligations are attached 
because the trustee will have property in his possession that belongs to 
another, and for no other reason. Indeed, the rule reflects, if anything, the 
general commitment of the common law and equity to respect for a person’s 
autonomy, rather than any obligation-based model of trusts.
In relation to terminating a trust, the rule in Saunders v Vautier 17 — that 
beneficiaries can call for the winding up of the trust — lends support to the 
proprietary conception of the express trust on the basis that the rule may 
be explained as recognising that trust property belongs ultimately to the 
beneficiaries.18 This power of the beneficiaries specifically defeats both the 
trustee’s obligations and his ownership and can only be justified as being a 
facet of the beneficiaries’ equitable proprietary rights.
B Identifying beneficiaries
A valid trust requires certainty of objects.19 It may be that the identification 
of beneficiaries is a necessary requirement because the trust is based on 
the property rights of those beneficiaries. It is arguable, however, that 
this justification is threatened by the relaxation of the certainty of objects 
requirement in the 1970s. The House of Lords’ decision in McPhail v 
 16 Further rules relating to other types of trusts may suggest a proprietary view is 
appropriate of trusts generally, and not just of express trusts. For example, Penner, 
above n 3, at 256–257, suggests that automatic resulting trusts can only be explained on 
the proprietary basis of trusts. A resulting trust arises where the trust fund of an express 
trust is not exhausted because the settlor has failed to transfer that property to another. 
Trust property must actually be given to someone else, thus reflecting the property aspect 
of a trust. Lord Browne-Wilkinson expressed some doubt about this in Westdeutsche 
Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council [1996] AC 669 (HL) 
[Westdeutsche] at 708, where his Lordship indicated that, in cases where the beneficial 
interest had not been exhausted, it ought to vest in the Crown as bona vacantia because 
the settlor’s intention was to abandon the property.
 17 Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115, 49 ER 282 (Rolls Court).
 18 Penner, above n 3, at 255.
 19 Re Flavel’s Will Trusts [1969] 1 WLR 444 (Ch); Re Gulbenkian’s Settlements (No 2) 
[1970] Ch 408 (Ch).
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Doulton,20 requiring identification of some, but not necessarily all, objects of 
the trust by use of the “is/is not a beneficiary” test, instead of a “complete list 
of the beneficiaries” test, may represent a move away from the trust’s being 
concerned primarily with the property rights of specific beneficiaries and 
towards the less demanding view that a trust exists as long as the trustee owes 
trust obligations to someone. However, even in light of this development, 
the requirement of certainty of objects may still be seen as consistent with 
the property conception. All that is necessary for the idea that the bene-
ficiary owns the trust property to have any meaning is that a beneficiary be 
identifiable. It does not necessarily require that the deed explicitly identify 
the beneficiary, but rather that a trustee be able to identify a beneficiary. In 
any event, the certainty requirement is fundamentally about enforceability 
and not ownership. Thus, the relaxation of the test in McPhail reflects a more 
liberal attitude towards identifying an enforcer than it says anything about 
preferring an obligational model of the trust over a proprietary model. It is 
not surprising that the same liberal attitude for identifying enforcers was 
extended to non-charitable purpose trusts at around the same time in Re 
Denley’s Trust Deed (Denley).21
Moreover, and as a related point, it is well accepted that in most cases 
an express trust must be for the benefit of a human beneficiary, and that 
the range of express trusts that will be upheld without there being a human 
beneficiary is limited. It is often said that a human beneficiary is required 
in order that someone has standing to enforce the trust against the trustee. 
In other words, it could be seen as an aspect of giving meaning to the 
obligation-based approach to trusts on the basis that the trustee’s obligations 
are meaningless unless they can be enforced. Indeed, non-charitable purpose 
trusts are sometimes called trusts of imperfect obligation for this very reason. 
There are as indicated, however, various exceptions to the human beneficiary 
principle that nevertheless give rise to valid trusts.22 These suggest that the 
human beneficiary principle is not concerned with providing for enforcement 
because the enforceability problem has been overcome in the exceptional 
cases by various legal mechanisms, such as “the factual or indirect beneficiary 
as enforcer” analysis adopted in Denley; “the remainderman as enforcer” 
analysis seen in some of the older cases; the statutory enforcement regimes, 
as enacted in a number of foreign jurisdictions; or, for public charitable 
 20 McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 (HL).
 21 Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 373 (Ch) [Denley].
 22 Examples are trusts for the maintenance of graves or monuments (Re Hooper [1932] 
1 Ch 38 (Ch); Re Budge (Deceased), Ex parte Pascoe [1942] NZLR 350 (SC)); or to 
provide for the care of animals following the owner’s death (Re Dean (1889) 41 Ch D 
552 (Ch); Pettingall v Pettingall (1842) 11 LJ Ch 176); and other miscellaneous trusts, 
such as a trust for the promotion of fox-hunting (Re Thompson [1934] Ch 342 (Ch)).
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trusts, the Attorney-General. Instead, the principle that there must be human 
beneficiaries in the law of private non-purpose trusts illustrates that trusts 
require someone to own the trust property beneficially. Trust property cannot 
be beneficially ownerless. The very fact that trusts without beneficial owners 
are permitted might be assumed at first sight to support an obligational view 
of trusts. However, the long struggle in English law to legitimate any non-
charitable purpose trusts, and the peculiar history of the law of charitable 
trusts, actually reveal the dominant hold of the property model of trusts on 
the English trust psyche and that these isolated cases are strictly exceptions 
to the general rule.
Notwithstanding these arguments in favour of the proprietary view, the 
well-accepted legitimacy of the discretionary trust presents a challenge. 
The ability of settlors to appoint discretionary beneficiaries is evidence that 
the concern of a trust is not that particular property is held for particular 
beneficiaries, and it is not necessary that an equitable proprietary right must 
be vested in a beneficiary for a trust to exist.23 Discretionary beneficiaries 
have long been understood to hold merely a hope or expectation and no right 
to any specific trust property unless and until an appointment of such is made 
to them.24 While it could be said that equitable property rights that rest on the 
beneficiaries collectively are still created in a discretionary trust, Parkinson 
has argued that this ought to carry little persuasive weight because there 
is no practical meaning or value to such rights until they vest personally.25
C Identifying trust property
In addition to certainty of beneficiaries, a valid trust also requires certainty of 
subject matter.26 The trust property must be clearly identified, which suggests 
that the property aspect of the trust is critical. However, this requirement 
has been interpreted in the cases as requiring only identifiable subject 
matter within which the trust property may be located, rather than requiring 
actual identification of the particular trust property itself.27 Parkinson 
submits that these cases show that it is not the trust property that must 
be certain. Instead, the concern is with the trust obligation being defined 
 23 Parkinson, above n 5, at 660.
 24 Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 553 (HL) [Gartside] at 606 per 
Lord Reid. See also Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Queensland) v Livingston [1965] 
AC 694 (PC) [Livingston] at 713.
 25 Parkinson, above n 5, at 661.
 26 Palmer v Simmonds (1854) 2 Drew 221; 61 ER 704 (High Court of Chancery).
 27 Hunter v Moss [1994] 1 WLR 452 (CA). See also Re Kayford Ltd (in liq) [1975] 1 WLR 
279 (Ch); Re London Wine Company (Shippers) Ltd [1986] PCC 121 (Ch).
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with sufficient certainty, so that in the event of dispute the court could, if 
necessary, determine the precise trust property.28 The property is not crucial; 
the obligation is. Nevertheless, while the degree of certainty may be flexible, 
it is well accepted that there can be no trust if there is no trust property.29 In 
addition, simply as a matter of practicality, the trust is generally valueless 
without property to which it can attach. Property is a fundamental aspect 
of the trust.
Nevertheless, it may be thought by some that to talk of trusts as requiring 
property, and of the beneficiary as in some way owning the property sitting 
in the hands of the trustee, is misleading. First, personal rights are often the 
subject matter of a trust,30 but personal rights are not traditionally understood 
to amount to “property” as such. Secondly, a beneficiary cannot be said 
to own the personal rights that are held by the trustee on trust for her. For 
example, in the case of shares held on trust, the trustee has all the rights 
attached to the shares, such as the right to vote, to receive dividends and so 
on. The beneficiary has none of these rights and thus, it is said, does not have 
any property. In my opinion, such an objection misunderstands the effect that 
a trust has on rights belonging to the trustee and takes a very narrow view 
of what is understood by the idea of property.
The mere fact that trusts can be established over contractual or other 
personal rights in the hands of the trustee does not mean that it is, therefore, 
wrong to speak of trusts as concerning property. To say so would be incorrect 
for two reasons. First, it would be to construe the notion of “property” 
very strictly so as to exclude intangible assets or funds. Yet, a covenant or 
contractual promise, for example, can be understood as a chose in action and, 
therefore, considered to be property in itself. Indeed, a narrow perspective 
on property would struggle to explain trusts over money, given that when 
the money is held in a bank, the account holder, strictly speaking, has only 
a chose in action as against the bank. Similarly, if the money is held in the 
form of cash, the holder of the cash has technically only currency, which 
is “merely tangible evidence of a personal claim against the Bank of [New 
Zealand] in the form of the legendary ‘promise to pay the bearer on demand’ 
the face value of the banknote”.31 Nevertheless, it is never suggested that 
money is not, in practice or in theory, property of some value.
Secondly, and notwithstanding the above discussion, the proprietary 
nature of the trust should not be taken to relate directly to the “thing” subject 
 28 Parkinson, above n 5, at 664.
 29 Fortex Group Ltd (in rec and liq) v MacIntosh [1998] 3 NZLR 171 (CA); Westdeutsche, 
above n 16.
 30 See, for example, Fletcher v Fletcher (1844) 4 Hare 67, 67 ER 564 (High Court of 
Chancery); Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 1177 (Ch).
 31 A Hudson, Equity & Trusts (4th ed, Cavendish Publishing, London, 2005) at 992.
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to the trust, but rather to the relationship between the trustee and beneficiary 
as related to the “thing”. Property rights have been theorised in different 
ways, including as rights in a thing and as rights against people.32 With some 
assets, such as land, it is easy to understand that property would be considered 
to refer to rights in the thing itself, but the recognition of property has not 
been limited to such simple and tangible assets as land, as the preceding 
paragraph makes clear, and the trust is one of these examples. The property 
rights of a beneficiary are not directly in the asset that is the subject matter 
of the trust, but rather in an ability to demand that a trustee adhere to the 
terms of the trust and to effectively control the actions of the trustee and, 
therefore, fetter the trustee’s own proprietary rights in relation to the trust’s 
subject matter. In other words, as between the trustee and beneficiary, the 
effect of the trust is to bestow on the beneficiary the value of the rights vested 
in the trustee as they relate to the thing and, in this sense, the beneficiary can 
be said to have proprietary rights.
D Trustee liability
Another aspect of trust law that supports the notion that beneficial owner-
ship is fundamental to the trust concept is that of trustee liability. Although 
the trustee is the legal owner, his personal liabilities for third party claims 
cannot be met from the trust property.33 This must be because the property 
belongs beneficially to another. However, it must be noted that this aspect 
of trust law was the subject of a dramatic recommendation of the English 
Trust Law Committee34 that the trust fund should be primarily liable for any 
third party claims arising from a trustee’s administration of the trust whether 
the trustee’s actions were ultra vires the trust terms or not, except where the 
trustee has actually been dishonest. This recommendation essentially rejects 
the proprietary view of trusts because it ignores the notion that the trustee is 
merely caring for property that is not his own in any true or beneficial sense.
 32 Ibid, at ch 31. See also Ross Grantham “Doctrinal Bases for the Recognition of 
Proprietary Rights” (1996) 16 OJLS 561.
 33 Bennett v Wyndham (1862) 4 De G F & J 259, 45 ER 1183.
 34 Trust Law Committee Rights of Creditors Against Trustees and Trust Funds 
(Butterworths, London, 1999) <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/content/1/c6/01/11/90/TLCCred
RightsReport140499_1.pdf >. These proposals have been substantially adopted in the 
British Virgin Islands; see J Mowbray et al, Lewin on Trusts (18th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2008) at [21-15].
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E Trustee duties
While some of the recent developments in trust law canvassed above might 
be taken to suggest a move away from the proprietary model, perhaps the 
most well-known development in support of the obligational model is the 
comparatively recent notion of the “irreducible core” of any trust, which is 
expounded in terms of obligations owed by the trustee to the beneficiary, 
rather than by reference to property held by the trustee for the beneficiary.35 
Millett LJ’s famous dictum in Armitage is as follows:36
[T]here is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the 
beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is fundamental to the concept 
of a trust. … The duty of the trustees to perform the trusts honestly and in 
good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries is the minimum necessary to 
give substance to the trusts, but in my opinion it is sufficient.
Nevertheless, the imposition of trust duties is clearly consistent with the 
property conception, which would explain most of the accepted duties as a 
natural consequence of the fact that the trustee is holding property for the 
benefit of another. The trustee holds property for another, thus, he must 
preserve it for that other. How is he to do that? Unless otherwise authorised, 
he must account properly for it;37 he must not take from it nor dissipate it;38 
he must not make an unauthorised profit from it;39 he must not act in relation 
to it, otherwise than for the purpose of the trust. These duties can all be 
explained as requisites of the notion that property held by the trustee belongs 
beneficially to the beneficiary, and thus the trustee is merely a custodian of it.
However, the proprietary approach may not explain duties that impose 
upon trustees a particular standard of care.40 Such duties include the duty 
of prudent investment41 and the duty to perform the trust honestly and in 
good faith.42 These duties are, in a sense, additional to the bare requirement 
that a trustee hold property for another. For example, the duty to invest 
 35 David Hayton “The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship” in AJ Oakley (ed) Trends 
in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) 47.
 36 Armitage, above n 1, at 253–254.
 37 Re Skinner [1904] 1 Ch 289 (Ch).
 38 Gartside, above n 24, at 602 and 607 per Lord Reid. See also Livingston, above n 24, 
at 713.
 39 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 (HL); Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 
134 (HL).
 40 Penner, above n 3, at 250.
 41 Re Whiteley (1886) 33 Ch D 347 (CA) [Whiteley] at 355 per Lindley LJ.
 42 Armitage, above n 1, at 253–254.
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prudently, so far as it is determined in accordance with the standard of a 
prudent person of business43 or an ordinary prudent man investing for the 
benefit of others and not for himself,44!cannot be explained solely by the 
notion that a trust arises where property is given to one for the benefit of 
another. Such a construction of the trust does not require anything more than 
mere preservation of the property. If the standard required of the trustee is 
anything higher than mere preservation, it may only be justified under an 
obligational model.45
Yet, the obligational model does not quite so easily provide a justifica-
tion for the content of trustees’ obligations. It tells us nothing other than the 
fact that obligations exist upon the trustee. It offers no explanation for why 
such duties are necessary or what their content ought to be. Thus, when one 
is concerned with identifying the duties of trustees and the corresponding 
rights of beneficiaries, the obligation theory merely begs the question. The 
trust property is the trustee’s own, but is subject to special obligations on the 
trustee that have proprietary effect — but why is it subject to such “special 
obligations”? And what should these “special obligations” be?
IV  The Nature of the Trust
The inability of either the property view or the obligation view of trusts 
to account comprehensively for trustee duties could indicate that the two 
conceptions are inadequate or that the commonly proclaimed list of duties 
is wrong. Given that the duties are well accepted as an accurate statement 
of trust law, a careful eye must be passed once more over the two underlying 
theories of the express trust. Neither theory, on its own, explains the duties. 
This may suggest that, rather than one conception being a more accurate 
reflection of the law of trusts than the other, both are highlighting different, 
but nevertheless necessary, features of the express trust.
A trust is fundamentally proprietary. The trustee owns property but not 
absolutely — the property must be held to benefit another. It is this that 
distinguishes the trust from any other arrangement and, if any part of that 
description is not present, an express trust cannot exist. The proprietary 
conception is accurate, notwithstanding the objections raised above, if 
what is understood by that description is that it does not require the trustee 
legally to own the property;46 nor does it require explicit identity of the trust 
 43 Trustee Act 1956, s 13B.
 44 Whiteley, above n 41.
 45 Penner, above n 3, at 264–265.
 46 This is necessary to account for trusts of “equitable” interests as well as legal interests.
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property, but merely certainty as to the trust property’s source;47 nor does it 
require all beneficiaries to own the property beneficially,48 but merely that 
the property must be beneficially applied to another.49
Thus, in relation to trustee duties, several of the well-accepted trustee 
duties enforce this proprietary feature of the trust — the trustee holds property 
for the beneficiary. The custodial nature of this role requires the property to 
be preserved and accounted for. So the proprietary conception of the trust 
gives rise to custodial duties on the trustee (such as to account properly; not 
to misappropriate or dissipate assets; not to make any unauthorised personal 
profit; and not to act for improper purposes). These are the “what to do” 
duties of the trust.
However, while the proprietary view of the trust tells us what the trust 
(or the trustee) does, it tells us nothing of how that is to be done. Is it enough 
merely that the trustee acts as a reasonable custodian or must he or she do 
more? This is, in my opinion, where the obligations-based view of the trust 
may provide vital assistance if it is understood to be a consequence of the 
proprietary basis of the express trust. Property is an essential means for 
realising our individual autonomy, and thus it is considered of significant 
value in our society. Consequently, where someone else holds property for 
us in a way that confers on them legal control, the law requires that some 
significant standards of care be imposed upon them to regulate how they are 
to carry out their custodial duties relating to the preservation of the property. 
These special obligations are required to protect the equitable property rights 
of the fixed beneficiary sufficiently or the hopes and expectations of the 
discretionary beneficiary that would otherwise be vulnerable to abuse by the 
trustee by his reliance on his legal property rights. The property conception 
deems the trustee to be a custodian; the obligations conception mandates a 
particular standard to be reached by the custodian.
 47 This is necessary to account for those cases that allow a trust in situations where it can 
only be said that the property from which the trust comes is certain, while the trust 
property itself is not; see above text to n 27.
 48 This is necessary to account for the ability to have discretionary beneficiaries who have 
no fixed interest in the trust property and therefore no proprietary interest, as such. It also 
suggests that private purpose trusts may present no true departure from the fundamental 
characteristics of a trust, such that they ought to be allowed.
 49 A consequence of this formulation of the proprietary nature of an express trust is that it 
is not necessary for any equitable or beneficial title to arise in the beneficiary in order 
for a trust to exist. The essential element of the trust, as it relates to property, is that the 
title of the trustee is significantly fettered. References to a split in legal and equitable 
title are, therefore, distracting. This does not, however, mean that beneficiaries never 
have any beneficial title, only that this is not a fundamental element of an express trust. 
Thus, fixed beneficiaries have equitable title and discretionary beneficiaries do not, but 
nevertheless a trust still exists in both instances.
!"#$%&'('%)))%&*+,-./*++000117 13'&3((00045110,6
554 [2010] New Zealand Law Review
Hence, the obligations conception of the trust explains those trust 
duties that reflect how the custodial duties should be performed (such as to 
perform the trust honestly, in good faith and impartially for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries; to invest according to the standard of a prudent investor, 
investing for the benefit of others and not for himself; and to exercise powers 
with good faith and on real and genuine consideration). These are the “how 
to” duties of the trust.50
Thus, the trust is not solely a mechanism that allocates rights to owner-
ship of property. It also imports certain additional personal obligations into 
it because of the type of relationship between the trustee and beneficiary 
that the settlor has chosen to impose. It is this modified understanding of 
the proprietary conception of the trust that ought to guide the law relating to 
express trusts. This article may not seem particularly groundbreaking given 
that all that has been achieved thus far is to affirm the current understanding 
of the content of trustees’ duties. However, its aim has been to do so using 
a theoretical understanding of the trust, rather than relying upon policy 
grounds or external factors that risk inconsistency and a lack of explanatory 
power from court to court. Thus, it offers a way to analyse particular issues 
within trust law from one common starting point that will enhance coherency 
and certainty across all of trusts law.
The remaining section of this article will seek to prove this point by 
applying the conceptual understanding of the trust advocated here to the 
current controversy of what rights beneficiaries have to trust information. 
It will be shown that the possible answers given to that question are deeply 
affected by one’s understanding of the nature of the trust.
V  Beneficiaries’ Rights to Trust Documents
The impact of the particular view of trusts that one adopts is readily evident 
in relation to the issue of disclosure of trust information to beneficiaries. 
A strict proprietary analysis of the trust will likely lead to a rule that bene-
ficiaries who “own” the property subject to the trust also own any related 
information, and thus are entitled to access such information. However, as 
has been highlighted above, not all beneficiaries can be said to own the trust 
property. An obligational approach, on the other hand, is even less forth-
 50 It may be that there are other commonly accepted duties of trustees that can be evaluated 
for their validity against this conceptual framework; see, for example, C Kelly and G 
Kelly “So you want to be a trustee” (paper delivered at New Zealand Law Society Trusts 
Conference, Auckland, June 2009).
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coming as it requires further work in order to justify a beneficiary’s right to 
information by the identification of a corresponding duty on the trustee to 
provide such information.
However, pursuant to the hybrid approach adopted in this article — an 
approach that emphasises the custodial role of the trustee and his conse-
quent duties of preservation to a high standard — a beneficiary’s right to 
information can be justified to extend beyond just those beneficiaries with 
a strict proprietary right. Before considering what the law in this area ought 
to be on the basis of an accurate conceptualisation of the trust, the current 
law on access to trust documents is first examined.
A Current law
Traditionally, beneficiaries with fixed interests in the trust fund were con-
sidered to have a proprietary right to any documents pertaining to the fund 
on the basis that all trust documents are trust property.51 This right did not 
extend to discretionary beneficiaries because they do not have proprietary 
rights in the trust property, but only a mere hope,52 although some cases 
had suggested that all beneficiaries, whether having fixed or discretionary 
interests, should be entitled to see the accounts.53
However, in recent times, what was previously understood as only a 
fixed beneficiary’s right has been reconceptualised by the Privy Council 
in Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd (Schmidt)54 as an aspect of the court’s 
inherent supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of trusts. The Board 
ruled that a proprietary right was neither sufficient nor necessary to give 
rise to a right to trust documents. In so doing, it extended to discretionary 
beneficiaries an ability to access such documents at the discretion of the 
court in order to enable them to hold the trustee accountable. Lord Walker 
indicated, however, that the nature of the beneficiary’s discretionary interest 
may make it difficult to persuade the court to grant access: “In many cases 
 51 O’Rourke v Darbishire [1920] AC 581 (HL); Murphy v Murphy [1999] 1 WLR 282 (Ch). 
This understanding has been questioned by Campbell who considers the early cases and 
argues that there was no such proprietary right because a particular beneficiary’s right 
was considered to depend on the particular circumstances, not on a strict property right 
per se; see J Campbell “Access by trust beneficiaries to trustees’ documents, information 
and reasons” (2009) 3 Journal of Equity 97 at 117 et seq.
 52 Worn v Buxton HC Auckland M 125-SD01, 17 June 2002.
 53 Armitage, above n 1, at 261 and 263.
 54 Schmidt v Rosewood Trust Ltd [2003] UKPC 26, [2003] 2 AC 709 [Schmidt], adopted 
in New Zealand in Foreman v Kingstone [2004] 1 NZLR 841 (HC) [Foreman].
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the court may have no difficulty in concluding that an applicant with no more 
than a theoretical possibility of benefit ought not to be granted any relief.”55
The Schmidt approach seeks to justify any disclosure essentially on the 
basis of judicial discretion under the auspices of the court’s supervisory role. 
Some have criticised Schmidt for the uncertainty it has created in relation 
to fixed beneficiaries. The Privy Council rejected the proprietary nature of 
the fixed beneficiary’s right as a justification for access to trust documents.56 
However, it has been noted that the effect of this on fixed beneficiaries, which 
was strictly obiter given that Schmidt concerned discretionary beneficiaries, 
creates undesirable uncertainty, and for that reason has been rejected by the 
New South Wales Supreme Court in McDonald v Ellis.57
The uncertainty is more widespread than that, however, as cases con-
cerning discretionary trusts since Schmidt have shown. In a recent decision 
of the English Chancery Division, Breakspear v Ackland (Breakspear),58!
the Court was concerned with the issue of disclosure of the settlor’s letter 
of wishes in the context of a discretionary family trust. The settlor had 
signed a wish letter to the effect that he wanted the trustees to exercise their 
discretionary power to appoint his third wife as a beneficiary of the trust 
upon his death. The wife was duly appointed and when the settlor’s children 
later learned of the trust, they requested disclosure of the letter. The trustees 
considered it to be non-disclosable. Briggs J agreed that the letter was prima 
face non-disclosable given its confidential nature arising from its function, 
which was to assist in the confidential deliberation process of the trustees’ 
exercise of discretionary dispositive powers. However, his Lordship then 
proceeded to consider whether the Court ought to exercise its overriding 
discretion. His Lordship suggested that only very special circumstances 
 55 Ibid, at [67].
 56 Ibid, at [52], relying on Kirby P’s statement in his dissenting judgment in Hartigan 
Nominees Pty Ltd v Rydge (1992) 29 NSWLR 405 (CA) at 421–422 that a proprietary 
right is neither sufficient nor necessary to give rise to a right to trust documents.
 57 McDonald v Ellis [2007] NSWSC 1068, (2007) 72 NSWLR 605, where Bryson AJ held 
that the beneficiary with a vested interest in trust property has a right to information 
about the trust. The Schmidt rule is “not a better rule, because it introduces discretion and 
promotes resistance and debate in substitution for a rule which is relatively concrete”: 
ibid, at [51]. However, it is noted that the Schmidt rule was accepted by the same court in 
an earlier decision involving fixed beneficiaries; see Avanes v Marshall [2007] NSWSC 
191, (2007) 68 NSWLR 595 at [15] per Gzell J. For criticism of the Schmidt rule in this 
context, see further G Dawson “A fork in the road for access to trust documents” (2009) 
3 Journal of Equity 39. In response to this argument of uncertainty, see Campbell, above 
n 51, who shows that prior to the Schmidt rule, there was necessarily some element 
of uncertainty given that the right of fixed beneficiaries to trust information was not 
absolute.
 58 Breakspear v Ackland [2008] EWHC 220, [2008] 3 WLR 698 (Ch) [Breakspear].
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should justify overriding confidentiality, such as evidence of bad faith on 
the part of the trustee; or where the trustees would soon seek the court’s 
sanction for a proposed final distribution of the trust property, which would 
necessitate disclosure of the letter in those proceedings. The present case 
fell within the latter exception and his Lordship accordingly allowed the 
claim for disclosure.
In Foreman v Kingstone (Foreman),59 the New Zealand High Court 
was faced with a request from the plaintiff-beneficiaries for disclosure of 
various trust documents: financial statements relating to the trust; details 
and accounts relating to any winding up and/or distribution or settlement, 
including to whom such were made; full information as to the amount and 
state of trust property; names of all previous and present trustees and dates 
of appointments and retirement, including relevant copies of deeds; and any 
memoranda of wishes. Potter J ordered disclosure (apart from information 
relating to the trustees’ reasons for exercising their discretion) on the basis 
that there were “no circumstances which should persuade the Court to 
override the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs as beneficiaries to the extent 
of the orders made to disclose”.60 Her Honour also indicated a preliminary 
view that any memoranda of wishes should also be disclosed.
What is interesting about these two cases is that both purport to follow 
Schmidt and yet both take rather polarised approaches. The English Court 
in Breakspear appeared to adopt the starting point that, if information 
relates to the confidential trustee deliberation process, then it will not be 
disclosed in the absence of special circumstances.61 The New Zealand Court 
in Foreman started from the position that the beneficiary had a fundamental 
right to information, but that it was not absolute, being subject to the court’s 
discretion to deny access in special circumstances.
At issue in this area is the conflict between two important interests: the 
beneficiary’s desire for trustee accountability and the trustee’s desire for 
confidentiality. The denial of a beneficiary’s request for trust documents is 
 59 Foreman, above n 54.
 60 Ibid, at [100]. Potter J ruled that an additional general request for copies of communications 
between trustees and advisors could not be granted without further clarification of the 
content of such documents so as to ensure that information pertaining to trustees’ reasons 
or other such confidential matters would not be disclosed. The statement of claim was 
not sufficiently detailed on these points.
 61 It is acknowledged that Briggs J stated in Breakspear, above n 58, at [73]: “There are 
no fixed rules, and the trustees need not approach the question with any pre-disposition 
towards disclosure or non-disclosure. All relevant circumstances must be taken into 
account ….” Nevertheless, the judgment shows overall a presumption by the Court in 
favour of confidentiality.
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often made on the basis that it would threaten the ability of the trustee to 
exercise his discretions properly if he cannot be assured of confidentiality:62
[T]he trustees are given a confidential role and they cannot properly exercise 
that confidential role if at any moment there is likely to be an investigation 
for the purpose of seeing whether they have exercised their discretion in 
the best possible manner.
Likewise:63
[T]he process of the exercise of discretionary dispositive powers by trustees 
is inherently confidential, and … this confidentiality exists for the benefit of 
beneficiaries rather than merely for the protection of the trustees.
However, as Sir Gavin Lightman has said, writing extrajudicially: “Trustees 
have no rights of confidence or privacy as such: it should only be claimed 
and respected when the need for it counter weighs countervailing consid-
erations.”64 What is necessary is to place the development of the case law, 
and this debate over confidentiality and accountability, against a theoretical 
framework of the trust to evaluate the Schmidt rule and to determine which 
of the conflicting interests ought to be given priority.
B A theory on the right to access trust documents
In this article, I have put forward a broad version of the proprietary concep-
tion that extends to beneficiaries who do not have an equitable proprietary 
interest in the trust property. Accordingly, the proprietary character of this 
model is not focused on any property right held by the beneficiary, but rather 
the property rights vested in the trustee and the necessary limitations placed 
upon those rights in the form of personal rights held by the beneficiary vis-
à-vis the trustee because the trustee holds the property for the benefit of the 
beneficiary and not for himself. The corresponding custodial duties of the 
trustee to ensure this arrangement is performed are to preserve and account 
for the property.
It is in that context that it must be asked whether a necessary conse-
quence of the trust arrangement is the need to make trust documents, other 
 62 Re Londonderry’s Settlement [1965] Ch 918 (CA) at 936 per Danckwerts LJ.
 63 Breakspear, above n 58, at [24].
 64 The Association of Contentious Trust and Probate Specialists Newsletter Issue 58, as 
cited by Toby Graham “Disclosure of letters of wishes and confidentiality of trustees’ 
deliberations after Schmidt” (2008) 14 Trusts & Trustees 231 at 234.
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than documents of account already required to be disclosed, available to 
the beneficiary. If the core duties are only those to preserve and account 
for the property, it is not necessary in order for beneficiaries to enforce this 
duty to have access to trust documents other than the accounts. Access to 
trust accounts will be sufficient. However, the core duties fundamental to 
the trust extend beyond merely the requirement to account for the property, 
and include obligations on the trustee to act honestly and in good faith. 
The beneficiary must in turn have rights that enable her to require due 
performance by the trustee of his duties.
Before considering whether a right to trust documents is required to 
enforce those additional standards-based duties, it is important to note that 
if, contrary to the theory advanced in this article, the proprietary conception 
is construed more narrowly, as being based on a division of legal and 
equitable title to the same property between the trustee and the beneficiary 
respectively,65 it is easy to see how one could say that a beneficiary has a right 
to trust documents based on their proprietary standing in relation to the trust 
property. This was of course the basis upon which beneficiaries were or were 
not granted access to trust documents until only very recently.66 Given that 
beneficial ownership in the trust property is not a necessary element of the 
trust as I have conceptualised it here, the right to trust documents, if it is to 
be a general right possessed by all beneficiaries and not merely beneficiaries 
with fixed interests, cannot rest upon the narrower version of the proprietary 
view of trusts.
Recalling that the obligational aspect of the trust requires in addition to 
the custodial duties, the duties of honesty and good faith in the performance 
of the trust, again, the relevant question is: in order for the beneficiary to 
enforce these obligations, is it necessary for her to have access to the trust 
documents? In my opinion, merely providing the accounts will not provide 
sufficient information to the beneficiary for her to ascertain whether the 
trustee has acted honestly and in good faith. The very nature of dishonesty 
is that it is deceptive and so will often not be manifestly obvious in limited 
documents of account.
It is surely necessary in order to enforce trustees’ duties of honesty and 
good faith that beneficiaries should generally be entitled to trust documents.67 
Thus, beneficiaries ought to have a prima facie right to trust documents, 
 65 While this may be the most common way that an express trust has been described in 
the past, it does not reflect our law of trusts, as shown in the discussions above, most 
obviously because trust law allows for discretionary beneficiaries who have only a mere 
hope or expectancy.
 66 Schmidt, above n 54.
 67 Recent support for this approach can be found in Re Maguire (deceased) [2010] 2 NZLR 
845 (HC) at [30] per Asher J: “[T]he preferable approach is to consider the beneficiary’s 
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based not on proprietary rights, but on the right to enforce the trust against 
the trustee. The often inherent conflict between accountability of the trustees 
to the beneficiaries and the confidentiality that is necessary to encourage 
trustees to exercise their discretions may impact upon this presumption. 
The important point to note, however, is that the presumption ought to be 
in favour of disclosure, which the trustee may then persuade the court to 
override in particular circumstances. Beneficiaries should not be required to 
prove their right to disclosure, but trustees ought to be required to prove any 
such right to, or interest in, confidentiality. Accountability is a fundamental 
characteristic of the trust; trustees’ confidentiality is not.
C Letters of wishes
The settlor’s letter or memorandum of wishes is often seen as a special 
document, sitting just outside the collection of documents that make up 
the trust documents. Since disclosure should be based on accountability 
(whether that is understood to be an aspect of the court’s inherent jurisdiction, 
as currently seems to be the case, or, as advocated here, an aspect of the 
fundamental nature of the trust and thus a right ascribed to the beneficiary), 
letters of wishes should accordingly be included in disclosure only if they 
are necessary to access in order to enforce the trustee’s duties.
It can be argued that where letters of wishes are understood to be non-
binding expressions of expectation by the settlor, they do not confer any 
duties on the trustees, thus they do not confer any rights on the benefi-
ciaries, and so should not rank as a trust document. No legal obligations 
have been imposed on a trustee to consider, let alone, obey a merely morally 
binding letter of wishes, and a trustee cannot be held accountable in respect 
of acting or refusing so to act on the settlor’s wishes.68 Likewise, if the letter 
is intended to be legally binding on the trustees, then accordingly it should 
be prima facie disclosable because it is in effect a trust document.69
On the other hand, it may be that this distinction between letters that are 
legally binding and letters that are only morally binding is somewhat overly 
clinical. As Briggs J said in Breakspear:70
rights to access trust documents as arising from a trustee’s duty to account for its actions 
to the beneficiaries and adhere to the terms of the trust.”
 68 Terence Tan Zhong Wei “The irreducible core content of modern trust law” (2009) 15 
Trusts & Trustees 477 at 490. See also Hayton, above n 35, at 52–53.
 69 David Hayton “English Fiduciary Standards and Trust Law” (1999) 32 Vanderbilt J 
Transnational L 555 at 573, cited in Zhong Wei, above n 68, at 490 n 94.
 70 Breakspear, above n 58, at [8].
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[F]ew would argue that clearly and rationally expressed wishes and relevant 
information included by settlors in wish letters could be treated by trustees 
as wholly irrelevant to the exercise of their discretionary powers[.]
Accordingly, if a trustee, obliged to act in good faith, could not simply 
ignore the settlor’s request, then perhaps the beneficiary should be entitled 
to see it. This may further be supported by consideration of the Hastings-
Bass rule that allows courts to set aside trustees’ decisions where those 
decisions were made in the absence of trustees taking into account relevant 
considerations that they ought to have taken into account.71 If the settlor’s 
recorded wishes are relevant considerations, then the beneficiary ought to be 
entitled to access these to ensure they have been considered.72 An obvious 
weakness of this argument is that mere access to the settlor’s wishes will 
not enable the beneficiary to determine whether those wishes have been 
considered as required because, first, the trustees are not bound to act upon 
them and, secondly, the trustee’s reasons for their decisions are normally 
not disclosed.73
Lee has suggested that the issue of whether letters of wishes should be 
disclosed ought to be determined by reference to the settlor’s intention in 
using such letters.74 Letters of wishes are not for the benefit of beneficiaries 
(whose interest is in disclosure to give effect to trustee accountability), nor 
for the benefit of trustees (whose conflicting interest is in confidentiality to 
effect their autonomy), but rather are created for the benefit of the settlor to 
attempt to get the trustees to give effect to her intentions at a time when she no 
longer has significant ability to control, influence or require anything of the 
trustees.75 So the competing interests may not be just those of accountability 
and autonomy, but also of settlor intention.
Given that the settlor has obviously chosen not to make her intentions, as 
expressed in the letter rather than in the trust deed, binding on the trustee, it 
could be said that she does not intend that they are necessary to the enforce-
ment of the trust, and as such are not vital to the beneficiary’s ability to hold 
 71 Re Hastings-Bass [1975] Ch 25 (CA).
 72 Zhong Wei, above n 68, at 491; D Hayton, P Matthews and C Mitchell, Underhill and 
Hayton Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees (17th ed, LexisNexis, London, 2007) 837.
 73 Successful Hastings-Bass applications are normally made by trustees seeking to reverse 
their own decision and who are, therefore, content to disclose the reasons for their 
decision.
 74 Rebecca Lee “Disclosure of Letters of Wishes in Family Settlements: Breakspear v 
Ackland ” (2009) 28 Estates, Trusts & Pensions Journal 105 at 108–109.
 75 Once the trust is created, the settlor effectively drops out of the trust picture; see David 
Hayton and Charles Mitchell Hayton and Marshall: Commentary and Cases on the Law 
of Trusts and Equitable Remedies (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2005) at 16.
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the trustee personally accountable. Accordingly, even if the settlor’s intention 
is considered relevant, letters of wishes generally ought not to be the sub-
ject of a beneficiary’s right to access. The letter of wishes is not truly a trust 
document because it does not determine trustees’ duties.
However, it may be that such letters contain information that would 
indicate trustees’ knowledge of circumstances relevant to beneficiaries, and 
thus relevant to whether the trustees are performing the trust honestly and 
in good faith. In this context, the role of the letter in disclosure would not be 
to determine the content of the trustees’ duties because it cannot; but would 
be to provide evidence of whether the trustees’ standards-based duties have 
been complied with. The question of disclosure in such a case could readily 
be determined by the court inspecting the letter first to assess its relevance 
to any such claim.76
D Primary v secondary beneficiaries
It has been common practice in discretionary trusts in New Zealand to appoint 
a class of primary beneficiaries and a class of secondary beneficiaries. For 
example, in a garden-variety discretionary family trust, mum and dad are 
the settlors, trustees (perhaps joined by a third professional or independent 
trustee) and the primary beneficiaries, whilst the children are the secondary 
beneficiaries. Discussions with trusts practitioners suggest that the pri-
mary beneficiaries are seen to be the real beneficiaries and the secondary 
beneficiaries are not intended to have any ability to access or enforce the 
trust. The perception is that this ought to be acceptable because as long as 
some of the beneficiaries — the primary beneficiaries in this context — can 
enforce the trust, there is no need to extend similar rights to the secondary 
beneficiaries.
There is, in the author’s opinion, no justification for distinguishing 
between classes of beneficiary in concluding that some beneficiaries ought 
to have a right to access trust information and others need not have one. 
Limiting the duty of trustees to account to only certain beneficiaries is 
repugnant to the nature of the trust because it is “an attempt to convert a 
discretionary trust for a large class into a discretionary trust for a small class 
with a discretionary power in favour of a larger class”.77 Either the secondary 
beneficiaries are beneficiaries or they are not. In relation to the family trust 
example, they must be beneficiaries and accordingly extended the necessary 
rights to enforce the trust.
 76 Re Avalon Trust [2006] JLR Note 19 (Royal Court).
 77 Hayton, above n 35, at 52.
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E Reform considerations
There is now no doubt that beneficiaries of all types may, as a statement of 
principle, be able to access trust documents, but there is significant confu-
sion as to the circumstances or factors that must or must not be present 
for such access to be granted. Founding access to trust documents on the 
court’s discretion does not give the beneficiary any certain right and already 
it is evident that that jurisdiction may lead some to assume a presumption 
in favour of disclosure78 and others a presumption against disclosure, but 
with the ability to rebut it either way.79 These alternative approaches show 
preference for one or other of the conflicting interests of accountability and 
confidentiality. Yet, accountability and not confidentiality is the underlying 
concern of trusts.
Recourse to the notion of the “court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction” 
is not necessary where it can be seen that every beneficiary ought to be 
considered to have a right to trust documents in order to enforce the trust, 
albeit that the right is not absolute, but can be fettered by concerns of trustee 
confidentiality and settlor autonomy.
Given that the New Zealand Law Commission is currently undertaking a 
review of trusts law, it may be that the current uncertainty could be effectively 
resolved by recognising a statutory right to disclosure of trust documents 
that can be limited in this way. Such a provision would foster certainty and 
would be consistent with the fundamental nature of the trust being concerned 
with the trustee’s accountability to another for property held legally by the 
trustee for the benefit of the other.
Accordingly, statute could provide for the beneficiaries’ right to dis-
closure of trust documents, but subject to the court’s discretion to limit it on 
the application of trustees. Trust documents should be defined to exclude 
letters of wishes that were not intended to be legally binding. Certain factors 
that courts could be instructed to consider in determining whether to fetter 
the beneficiary’s right could include:
• whether the trustee can be held accountable for his core duties not-
withstanding that certain documents are to be withheld;
• what the likely intention of the settlor was in relation to beneficiaries’ 
access to trust information as construed from the deed and surrounding 
circumstances,80 but only in such a way as to be consistent with the 
fundamental nature of the trust;
 78 Foreman, above n 54.
 79 Breakspear, above n 58.
 80 Campbell, above n 51.
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• whether the withholding of certain trust information is necessary to 
achieve the purpose of the trust to hold the property for the benefit 
of all the beneficiaries — for example, where disclosure of the 
information concerned could adversely affect the interests of other 
beneficiaries (requiring personal confidentiality) or protection of the 
trust property (requiring commercial confidentiality);
• whether limited disclosure could be effected by limiting the recipi-
ents of the information to, for example, only certain beneficiaries or 
to the beneficiary’s representative, or to another party able to effect 
enforcement of the trust on behalf of all the trust beneficiaries, such 
as a protector or enforcer; and
• whether limited disclosure could be achieved by restricting the use 
of the information disclosed by, for example, requiring professional 
undertakings.
VI  Conclusion
No particular area of trust law can be adequately analysed without an under-
lying conception or framework that identifies what the nature of the trust is. 
Accordingly, a good deal of this article was devoted to considering the two 
most common models of express trusts — the proprietary and the obligation-
based models. From the various rules of trust law can be drawn significant 
support for (and opposition to) both models. On account of those rules, this 
article has advocated that the correct understanding of the nature of the trust 
is that it is a unique combination of both of those conceptions, but with the 
obligational aspects taking their meaning and content from the proprietary 
nature of the trust.
Essential to the trust is that it must involve property owned by the trustee 
who must hold it for the benefit of beneficiaries. The property need not be 
identified absolutely as long as the source from where it is to be drawn 
is known with certainty; and the beneficiaries need not have equitable or 
beneficial title in the property for a trust to arise. The trust is essentially a 
relationship formed around one’s custodianship of property for the benefit 
of the other.
The trustee’s custodial obligations in relation to the property are to 
preserve and account for it to the beneficiary, and because of the special 
value of property and the beneficiaries’ vulnerability to the trustee, the 
trustee must perform his custodial tasks to certain standards for the benefit 
of the beneficiaries — he must invest prudently and he must act honestly 
and in good faith.
These characteristics or requirements of the trust are irreducible and 
their implications for questions concerning particular areas of trusts law 
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ought to be borne in mind. The latter part of this article sought to show 
that conceptualising the trust appropriately impacts upon whether or not it 
is legitimate to recognise beneficiaries as having a right of access to trust 
documents. It was advocated here that in order to enforce the substantive 
duties owed by the trustees that are necessary for any trust, beneficiaries 
need to have procedural rights of access to trust information. Suggestions 
have been made in the second half of this article as to the precise scope and 
limitations of such rights as they relate to trust documents.
Various other rights claimed by beneficiaries could also be analysed in a 
similar manner to determine their legitimacy. For example, is it necessary, in 
order to enable beneficiaries to hold trustees accountable for their custodial 
and standards-based duties, for all beneficiaries to have the right to be 
informed of their beneficial status or to have access to trustees’ reasons for 
their decisions? Likewise, other areas of trust law, such as trustee exemption 
clauses, could be similarly examined with reference to the conceptual nature 
of the trust to determine their appropriate content and limits.
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